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(ij=O, 1,2,** *) ) Let i1=,liMnooP{In= I(i=0 2 12 ). These limits always exist and they are all nonnegative. [7] It is well knownt191 that, for an ergodic chain, the { rj form a distribution function and are uniquely determined by the system of linear equations: irj= ieI 7rXiPj for jEI, and E jerj= 1.
(6)
A detailed analysis of problems of recurrence and transiency for the general balking process may be found in reference 9, where the process is imbedded at instants of joining rather than at instants of arrival. Additional results about the relations between the limiting probabilities and mean queue sizes of the above two imbedded Markov chains may be found in reference 21.
THE GI/M/l/n QUEUE SUPPOSE NOW that the service facility has a limited waiting room of size n. That is, there could be at most n+ 1 customers in the system including the one in service. An arrival who finds more than n customers ahead of him balks with probability one. Suppose also that customers who find the system in state i<n join the queue with positive probability. In summary, this situation is equivalent to having {Di} such that 0< Di < 1 for i= 0 1, 2, , n and Di=:0 for all i> n+ 1. We denote this queuing process by GI/M/1/n.
The transition matrix of the GI/M/1/n queue (imbedded at instants of arrival) is of order n+2 and is mainly derived from (5). The only modification is made on the (n+2)nd row. We have: pij= qij( 1 )Di+qij(0) (1-Di), (i=O,1 ,n;j=O,1, , n+1) (7) pn+l,j=qn+l,j (0).
(j=0 1, * *, n+1)
The finite Markov chain thus defined is irreducible and aperiodic, and therefore has a single ergodic class (independent of the relative values of X and A) with n+2 positive recurrent states. We may say that the process 'regulates' itself by forcing ultimate balking whenever the queue size is beyond a given limit. Let In={01 2,... ,n,n?1}. Denoteby The Effect of the Capacity n on the System We now consider n as a controllable parameter and examine its effect on the limiting probabilities and the mean queue size of the process. Define a special balking rule called deterministic control limit rule n and denoted by RnD as: Rf= Di:Di=1, i<n; D=O, i>n}. This rule corresponds to setting the waiting-room capacity at level n and balking if and only if the system is full. We have the following: LEMMA 1. For any n>O, rules R.D and Rn+1, and every isIT, 7r(n) -7ri+,(n+ 1) =7ri(n) 7ro(n+ 1 ).
This is an immediate result of relation (9). Let L(n) denote the mean queue size of the imbedded Markov chain when rule RnD is employed. Using (12), we obtain the following result readily:
The proof of Lemma 3 and an inductive proof of Theorem 2 [using relations (6) and (7)] may also be found in reference 21: LEMMA 3. For any n 0 and rules RnD and R +1 we have wo(n) > wo(n+ 1).
THEOREM 2. For any n O and rules RnD and ,+ L(n+1)>L(n). COROLLARY 1. 1-7ro(n+ 1) >7ro(n+1)L(n). This is an immediate consequence of Lemma 2 and Theorem 2.
OPTIMAL CUSTOMERS' BALKING RULES
WE DIFFER NOW from many studies of queuing systems for which either it is assumed that every arrival joins the queue with probability one, or it is supposed that a specific balking rule is given in advance: We will be interested in finding optimal balking and joining rules for the customers in the GI/M/1 queuing process. When saying 'optimal' we mean optimal according to some economic criterion, and for this reason we will subsequently impose a cost structure on the system and define several objective functions. The problems we will be concerned with are: (i) When should an individual customer join the queue? What is the structure of his optimal joining or balking rules, and how are these rules affected by the cost parameters? (ii) What is the structure of the optimal policy when the customers are organized in order to achieve public optimization-that is, long-run average net benefit per individual-and how can such an optimal policy be found? (iii) What is the relation between these two procedures? Or, does self optimization bring public or social optimization?
The Cost Structure
We make the following assumptions for the cost structure: (A) We suppose that, upon successful completion of service, the customer obtains a nonnegative finite reward of G monetary units. In fact, the existence of such a reward is what attracts customers to the counter.
(B) There is a finite service charge 0 that has to be paid (to the service station) by every customer who passes through service. We denote by g = G-0 the net reward of a customer who has been served. We note here that, because of the Markovian properties of the model, and since join-or-balk decisions are made only at times of arrival, reneging would never be optimal, i.e., once joining, a customer leaves the system only after his service is completed.
(D) As is usually supposed in queuing models, we assume that the set of costs {G, 0, c, 1} is the same for all customers.
(E) In order to eliminate trivialities, we assume that q-(c/u) ? -1. This last assumption will be clarified later.
The Decision Process
As was pointed out above, our process is a special Markovian decision process. In general, a policy R for controlling the system is a set of We now proceed to find optimal balking procedures for our queuing model.
Customer Self-Optimization
We consider now the decision problem of an individual customer who arrives at the counter and ponders whether to join or not. The problem of interest is thus to find a set of joining probabilities {DkR(* ) } such that the customer's expected net benefit will be maximized. Suppose a customer arrives and finds i(i=O, 1, * * * ) customers ahead of him. If he balks, he incurs a penalty 1 and consequently his net benefit is -1. If he decides to join the queue, he will have to wait for a time period equal to his own service time and the service times of the i customers ahead of him, and only then will he obtain the reward g. Recall that a customer who joins the line never leaves before service completion. Since the service time is exponential with parameter u, the customer's expected total waiting time in the system is (i+ 1) /IA, and therefore his expected net benefit is g-(cbu)(i+1). 
Thus
A brief observation reveals the interesting fact that the control-limit rule, as given by (16) or (18), is a function only of g, c, 1, and At and is independent of the arrival rate X. This fact might lead one to suspect that, in the long run, a greater average reward per customer may be obtained by taking the arrival phenomena into consideration when looking for an optimal strategy than by ignoring them. These ideas are studied in the following section.
Social Optimization
As noted above, one might ask himself whether the policy n8, applied by every customer to optimize his individual expected net benefit, is also an optimal policy when the public or collective good is sought. In other words, suppose that the customers form a cooperative and their joint objective is to find a policy that will maximize the long-run average net benefit per customer (or, equivalently, per unit time) for all customers in the cooperative. Then, questions that obviously arise are as follows:
(i) Does an optimal policy exist? (ii) If it does, is it a control-limit rule? (iii) If the optimal rule is a control limit rule, is nS the control limit? (iv) How does the average reward under a cooperative arrangement compare to the average reward under individualism?
We will show that, among all rules RECs, there exists a deterministic control-limit rule with finite control limit, denoted by no, that is optimal for social optimization. Moreover, it will be shown that, for fixed g, c, ,u, 1 and X, the optimal control limit no is not necessarily the same as n8, the optimal control limit for self-optimization, and, in fact, no?n8.
We now show that, for our particular model and with respect to the average reward objective function OR, the class C, is covered by the class CCL.
More precisely, let us define an equivalent relation as follows: DEFINITION. Two policies R and R' are said to be 4-equivalent if OR = OR'
We then have the following: LEMMA 4. For every rule RECs, there exists a (-equivalent rule R eCCL.
Proof. Let { di:1 >d 0> } be an arbitrary sequence of nonnegative numbers. Let RECS. As noted above, R could be described completely by the set {D,} of joining probabilities. Hence, let R= {Di:Di=d,, i= 0, 1, -}. Let J= {j:dj=O}, that is, J is the collection of all indices for which balking occurs with probability one. Let k=min{j:jeJ}, and let r=sup{j:jeJ}. If J is empty, then ReS, and therefore R&CCL. Suppose J is not empty. If at time ro the system starts at state flo ? r, or whenever the system under R is ergodic, then, any rule RkECCL such that Rk= {D,: Di=di, i~k; Di=O, i>k} is O-equivalent to R, since for both rules the effective state space is Ik= {0, 1, -, k+1 }. If the system under R is not ergodic and qo>r, then there is a positive probability of the queue size increasing beyond all bounds, and thus any rule R'CECCL such that R' = {Di:Di>O, i r; Di=di, i>r} is +-equivalent to R, since for both rules the average reward diverges to -co From Lemma 4 it follows that, as far as average reward is considered (and for stationary rules), it suffices to deal only with control-limit rules. Thus, in the rest of the section we will consider only this type of rule.
We recall that a customer who joins the queue when the system is in state j spends an expected total time of (j+1)/,u in it. Thus, for every m=0, 1, , we define the reward function Wm Our objective now is to find a rule for social optimization, that is, our problem is to find a rule R* so as to maximize 'PR over all rules RECs (practically, over all rules RECCL). THEOREM 3. For any finite state space, In {O, 1, .n , n+ 1}, there exists a deterministic control-limit rule RECDCL that maximizes As.
Proof. It is well known [1'3] that, for a finite state space with a finite number of actions, there exists a nonrandomized rule R* ECD that maximizes OIR. Let R* = {D*}, where Di* =0 or 1, iEI. Let j==min{i:Di*=0}. Clearly, j ? n+ 1. Thus, the process will consist of only j+1 recurrent states, as, once occupying any state below j, it will never get beyond j.
The rule R = {Di:Di= 1, i<j; Di = 0O i>j} will achieve the same long-run average reward as R*, and hence is optimal. The fact that RECDCL completes the proof.
The consequence of Theorem 3 is that, whenever n < oo is the capacity of the waiting room, then the optimal rule that maximizes 'R can be found among the n+1 possible deterministic control-limit rules. Proof. We will show that there exists an m such that, whenever n> m, We can now show that, among all stationary policies ReCs, the optimal one is indeed a finite deterministic control-limit rule; that is: THEOREM 6. There exists a fnite number no such that OPRD = SUPReCS 'PR.
Proof. From Lemma 4 it follows that only control-limit rules need to be considered. If the control-limit rule generates a finite effective state space, then our assertion follows immediately from Theorem 3. So, it remains to consider only infinite control-limit rules. Let R be arbitrary such that R= {Di:Di>0, i =O, 1, -}. If the process generated by R is not ergodic, then, by the discussion of the preceding theorem, any finite control-limit rule Rk would be better. Since a rule Rk generates an actual finite state space, the existence of no follows from Theorem 3. Thus, we may suppose that R generates an ergodic process. We define the sequence of control-limit rules {Rk, k=0, 1, * * } such that Rk= {Di:Di>O, i<k,
D>O, i>k}.
Clearly, Rk-ER as k00oo. We define also the sequence of average rewards {Rk, k = o, 1, * * * }. Since the process is ergodic, 4R exists and 'PRk-)4R as k-aoo . From Theorem 3 it follows that, for each Rk, there exists a deterministic control-limit rule RD(k) such that ORD We can now find a stronger upper bound than (25) on no, the optimal (deterministic) control limit for social optimization. Eventually we will show that nob n,. For this purpose we use HOWARD'S algorithm. [ We recall that we need to consider only deterministic control-limit rules, and therefore we start Howard's procedure by letting k=1 whenever q,=in8 and k=0 whenever wT=i, n, <i-M.
That is, we start with a deterministic control-limit rule R D = {Di:Di= 1, We can now prove the following: THEOREM 7. no<n8.
Proof. Since only deterministic control-limit rules need to be considered, it suffices to show that k =1 for i> ns is never an improvement on The interpretation of this fact and Theorem 7 is that, for the system studied, exercising narrow selfinterest by all customers seldom optimizes public good.
Formulation as a Linear Program
We have just shown that no-n,. 
Thus, following MANNE, 151 WOLFE
We may summarize this result by saying that, among all stationary policies, the optimal rule for social optimization is: join if and only if the observed queue size is not greater than no as given by (29).
OPTIMAL STATION-TOLL CHARGES
IN THIS SECTION, we relax the assumption that 0, the service charge, is fixed. We will treat 0 as a controllable parameter and determine its optimal values in various circumstances. First, we analyze the situation where the agency that operates the service station is governed by the customers themselves, and thus, both the policy of balking or joining and the level of the service toll 0 are solely decided by the customers. Next, we treat the case where the toll-collecting agency is a profit-making organization, completely divorced from the individual or collective economic interests of the customers. In this case, the agency will seek to impose a toll Or designed to maximize its own revenue rather than to optimize the whole system. We show how Or is determined for the two distinguished possibilities: (i) The customers employ an individual policy n,.
(ii) The customers employ the 'collective' policy no. We observe that, for both cases, the fact that the optimal (deterministic control limit) rule n(0) is completely known to the service station for any toll charge 0 is analogous to the monopoly model of price theory.
Over-all Optimization
In the preceding sections, it was assumed that G, c, X, 4, and 0 were fixed. We have seen that the arrival rate X could be changed into an effective arrival rate by applying a control-limit rule-n8 or no-in order to optimize the individual or the collective objective function. In many queuing models, the attempt to improve the over-all performance of the system is made by proposing a modification in the service process itself, or by assigning some priorities in order to minimize costs. Another approach might be to examine how the join-or-balk decisions of the customers -and thus the queue size-are affected by changes in 0, the service toll. are obtained from (29) and (18) respectively. As noted, the fact that, except for particular values of the parameters, we would have no <n8 points out that consideration of narrow self-interest does not ordinarily lead to over-all optimality. That is, a situation may occur in which-if the customers behave according to a criterion of narrow self-interest-the facilities of the system will be over-congested. However, if the service station is operated by some nonprofit organization dedicated to a more global concept of optimization, or whenever the customers themselves collectively govern the operations of the station (through an appointed agency, say), then an ameliorated state of affairs can be achieved. More specifically, we view the problem as of how to cause an individual customer to employ the no strategy rather than the n8. This last statement follows from the observation that, for any strategy RJD, the average reward per customer is given by 4R,,D and thus, by definition of no, q5RD >AD:RD.
n0 s n
If the individual customers are not likely to be persuaded by argument alone, then two distinct ways might be used in order to reduce the queue size. One way is an administrative measure that will limit the capacity of the system to the no level. Since no< no, the only obstacle for individual customers to join the queue will be the limited capacity, and thus an over-all optimization will be achieved.
Perhaps of more interest is the situation where the toll charge is used as a device for controlling the queue size. Without loss of generality, we may assume that the initial charge is 0 = 0 (i.e., g = G) and our objective is to find Oo so as to achieve 
Clearly, n* obtained from (32) is such that n* =no(0) which motivates (30). Note that another implicit assumption is that the station's operating costs are independent of the particular level of the control-limit rule.
If, however, there are some additional costs involved in the collecting of the extra service charge, and/or the redistributed amount is discounted, then, still, an over-all optimization can be achieved, although the computations will not be so easy as in ( Clearly, n no(aOo), from which it follows that 0o is such that n,(Go)= no(aco).
It just remains to find the actual value, or, rather, the range, of Oo. Using ( That is, any value of 0o in the above interval will compel the selfish customers to employ the n8(Go) policy and thus cause-willingly or not-an over-all optimization.
Station Optimization
SUPPOSE NOW THAT the toll-collecting agency is a profit-making organization that is completely divorced from the individual or collective economic interests of the customers. In this case, the agency will seek to impose a toll Or designed to maximize its own revenue rather than to optimize the whole system. We assume that the agency's objective is to maximize the expected average collected toll per unit time, or, equivalently, per arriving customer. (Once again, we assume that either the station's operating costs are negligible, or independent of the policy used by the customers.) However, the agency realizes that for any service charge 0 the customers, trying to achieve the best for themselves, employ some control-limit rule n = n( 0) [either n8 ( 7rn+l(n), the probability of balling, is equivalent to the probability of a lost sale. Case 2: no. In this case, we assume that the customers are organized and try to achieve the 'best' for their entire community. Thus, for every service charge 0, they employ a control limit rule no(0) that maximizes the average net benefit per customer.
The agency's objective now is to find 0r* so as to Notice that [1 -ir.(n)]0, which is to be maximized by the agency, is one of the terms to be minimized by the customers.
We now give a straightforward, one-pass algorithm to find 6r*.
Step .+i(ni)]0&} and denote by j the index for which this maximum is achieved. Let t be such that 6t = max { 6k: 6kESj j} that is, 6Ot= Oj. If t=O, then ,r* 0o. If t7;O, go to step 4.
Step 4. The optimal value Gr* is now in the interval [6t, Ot-1). Thus we are looking for 6E[Gt, 6Ot-) such that 
